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e number of electric vehicles (EVs) is steadily growing. is
provides a promising opportunity for balancing the smart grid of
the future, because vehicle-to-grid (V2G) systems can utilize the
baeries of plugged-in EVs as much needed distributed energy stor-
age: In times of high production and low demand the excess energy
in the grid is stored in the EVs’ baeries, while peaks in demand
are mitigated by EVs feeding electricity back to the grid. But the
data needed for managing individual V2G charging sessions as well
as for billing and rewards is of a highly personal and therefore sen-
sitive nature. is causes V2G systems to pose a signicant threat
to the privacy of their users. Existing cryptographic protocols for
this scenario either do not oer adequate privacy protection or fail
to provide key features necessary to obtain a practical system.
Based on the recent cryptographic toll collection framework
P4TC, this work introduces a privacy-preserving but ecient V2G
payment and reward system called P6V2G. Our system facilitates
two-way transactions in a semi online and post-payment seing.
It provides double-spending detection, an integrated reputation
system, contingency traceability and blacklisting features, and is
portable between EVs. e aforementioned properties are holisti-
cally captured within an established cryptographic security frame-
work. In contrast to existing protocols, this formal model of a
V2G payment and reward system allows us to assert all properties
through a comprehensive formal proof.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In an eort to counter global warming and fossil fuel depletion,
energy transitions from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources are
expedited on a global scale. is change from time-independent,
fully controllable power plants to highly volatile, seasonal and
distributed renewable power generation poses many challenges.
Foremost among them is balancing generation and demand to main-
tain stability of the energy distribution system and provide uniform
power quality. is requires increased storage capacities and load
exibility. One aspect of the energy transition—which has the po-
tential to solve at least part of this problem—is the introduction of
electric vehicles (EVs) as a means of private and public transporta-
tion. EVs do not require fossil fuels and can signicantly reduce
air and noise pollution, especially in urban areas. Most industrial
nations have started to subsidize EVs as well as set concrete objec-
tives on how many EVs they want to deploy by a certain year [25].
Target dates for complete bans on the sale of new cars with internal
combustion engines are as early as 2020 in some countries—with
many others planning to have phased them out by 2030 [11, 20, 39].
While EVs themselves pose a substantial and growing demand on
the system, they also have the capacity to contribute to a solution.
Privately owned vehicles remain parked for more than 95% of the
time [35]. During this time the EV’s baery can be utilized in a
vehicle-to-grid (V2G) scheme, providing storage capacity and exi-
bility in the recharging process to help balance power generation
and demand in the grid [35]: Surpluses from volatile renewable
power generation can be stored in parked EV’s baeries, which col-
lectively provide substantial distributed energy storage. Conversely,
energy stored in EVs can be used to mitigate peaks in demand and
drops in generation. In contrast to the benets such a system pro-
vides it can also pose a signicant threat to the privacy of its users
[26, 36]. e individual location data that may be gathered from
identifying or linkable transactions is highly sensitive and can be
maliciously exploited. To further participation in a voluntary V2G
system, privacy guarantees can be just as important as low eort
usability, as concerns arising from loss of personal information as
well as any eort required from the user could discourage its use.
Facilitating eortless payment for EV charging at a public charging
spot (EVSE) as well as rewards for ancillary services during the
charging session while keeping transactions privacy-preserving,
unidentifying, and unlinkable poses a big challenge.
is paper introduces a novel and privacy-preserving V2G pay-
ment system called P6V2G. It was developed by adapting the re-
cently proposed cryptographic toll collection system P4TC [32]
to a V2G seing where multiple charging point operators provide
publicly accessible EVSEs for EVs. P6V2G facilitates two-way trans-
actions for EV charging, allowing both payment from the user to
the operator for having their vehicle charged as well as rewards for
providing the EV’s baery as a buer to the grid. P6V2G is a post-
payment system where a user accumulates debt and rewards on a
wallet and gets periodic, e.g., monthly, bills from their e-mobility
operator (eMO). erefore, P6V2G oers convenient low eort us-
ability, leading more people to make their EV’s baeries available
for ancillary services. Our protocols are designed to be ecient
even when performed on low performance hardware that is realis-
tically present in EVs, EVSEs and wallets.
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To further take realistic
technology restrictions into account, EVSEs are not required to
have permanent online capabilities; tasks can be conducted oine
without loss of any functionality. An integrated reputation scheme
records how reliable the user is, e.g., in leaving their EV plugged
in as long as they predicted at the start of a charging session. is
enables EVSEs to beer plan the charging of vehicles and, e.g., oer
cheaper/higher rewarded long term charging to reliable users. To
ensure security, P6V2G provides a fraud detection mechanism that
not only detects fraudulent behavior and identies the misbehav-
ing user, but outputs a publicly veriable proof of guilt to avert
the possibility of false accusations. With consent of a designated
authority, misbehaving users can have their wallets traced (con-
tingency traceability), blacklisted, or their debt recalculated—for
instance if the user fails to present their wallet for billing at the end
of a billing period. In addition, our system implements a mecha-
nism to blacklist EVs (independently of blacklisted wallets), so that
stolen vehicles can be traced or even detained at an EVSE. Since
EVs and wallets are modeled as two dierent entities in P6V2G,
they may be combined arbitrarily, resulting in a portable system.
is is particularly useful for users with multiple cars as well as
for renting or sharing EVs. e whole system is formalized in a
comprehensive security model and validated by a rigorous proof
asserting system security as well as user privacy.
1.1 Related Work
In this section we rstly give a summary of dierent payment
and reward systems that were proposed for, or can be adapted to
a V2G seing. is overview shows that while all of them have
their respective merits, none so far provides solutions for all the
challenges and restrictions posed by realistic V2G interactions. In
a second part, we give a more detailed introduction of the two
cryptographic systems (BBA+ [29] and P4TC [32]) that our own
V2G system P6V2G is based on.
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Wallets might be realized on smart phones, but a separate device like a smart card
might be more desirable as it can be le in the car. To handle the low performance of
currently available smart cards, we would assume wallets to act as a secure store of
the users secrets only and be able to outsource more costly computation to the EV.
Other (V2G) Payment and Reward Systems. ere are several
previously published payment and reward systems that can be de-
ployed in a V2G scenario. Reward-only systems (without two-way
payments) include TPP [44], and PRAC [43]. Both systems are not
able to aggregate rewards. is results in linkability unless rewards
are suciently uniform and redeemed individually. Furthermore
both systems require permanent online capabilities and very few
properties are proven in any formal way. For the remainder of this
paragraph we will focus on payment systems that oer two-way
transactions. A terse comparison of the discussed systems, the
common options of (Chip-and-PIN) Debit/Credit Card and Paper
Cash, and our system is depicted in table 1. In a survey by Han and
Xiao [28] another overview of several V2G payment and reward
systems, as well as a general summary of challenges and methods




































































































































PRT [4] 3 7 7 n/a1 7 3 7 3 3/7
PnC (ISO 15118) [21, 22] 7 3 3 n/a2 7 n/a2 3 7 7
E-Cash [7] 3 7 3 3 7 7 7 3 3/7
Debit/Credit Card 7 7/3 3 n/a2 7 n/a2 3 3 7
Paper Cash 3 7 3 n/a 7 7 7 3 7
P6V2G 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
1
Double-spending detection is not applicable in online systems.
2
Double-spending detection/traceability are not applicable in identifying systems.
Table 1: Comparison of Two-way Payment Systems
In 2012, Liu et al. [38] proposed a system designed to provide
privacy at the “right” time (PRT), which has been further improved
by Au et al. [4]. PRT facilitates two-way transactions between an
EV and a single operator running multiple EVSEs. Further parties
representing the operator include a grid management and a billing
server. User’s accounts are pre-paid and have to be topped up
regularly. is excludes the possibility of problems arising from
users who do not pay their bills (on time) but requires more eort
on the user side and leads to users being stuck at EVSEs if they do
not have sucient balance on their account to charge an empty
EV. Each EVSE needs a permanent connection to the operator’s
other parties as PRT is designed as an online system. In particular,
all-time access to the central billing server is essential to prevent
double-spending. Further assumptions are some read-only memory
on the EV that can not be removed from the vehicle. PRT provides
traceability that is facilitated by a judge authority and only possible
with the user’s consent. Via this traceability the system implements
lost protection, dispute resolution and tracing of stolen vehicles.
While neither [38] nor [4] provide any reputation system, [38]
describes the possibility of facilitating a portable mode where the
account is managed on some mobile device instead of the EV. is,
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however, excludes other features like correct tracing and the system
still relies on a read-only memory that now has to be available on
this mobile device. [4] includes two game-based proofs for cheating
prevention and location privacy. Unfortunately these proofs only
assert the impossibility of very specic aacks on the system and
do not give any guarantees for aacks that were not explicitly
considered.
e International Electrotechnical Commission’s V2G standard
ISO 15118 [21, 22] allows for contract based charging called “Plug
& Charge” (PnC). In this system the EV shows a valid contract
certicate from its eMO to the EVSE at the start of a charging ses-
sion. At the end of each charging session, the EV signs the service
detail record (SDR) of this session and sends it to the EVSE. In
an online phase, the EVSE sends the SDR to the respective eMO
who collects and uses them to bill the contract owner at the end
of each billing period. Since the certicate includes the contract
ID, this system is fully identifying. Furthermore—since the sys-
tem is not portable between EVs—driver specic billing within EV
eets (like car sharing or company eets) is not possible while
simultaneously preserving the drivers privacy from the operator
of this eet: the corresponding eMO has to provide the eet oper-
ator with a detailed account of all the EV’s charging sessions so
they can match them to specic drivers. e PnC system facili-
tates semi online post-payments and provides blacklisting. Please
also note that only minimal security is guaranteed in ISO 15118.
While o-the-shelf cryptographic methods like encryption and
signatures are employed for EV authentication and to guarantee
privacy from eavesdropping but non-involved parties, EVSEs are
essentially assumed to be trustworthy and very lile user security
is oered. Furthermore, no resulting privacy or security guarantees
are formalized, formally discussed or proven. In addition to the
PnC payment method, the ISO 15118 allows for alternative pay-
ment methods (like P6V2G) to be added in future. Although the ISO
15118 only deals with direct communication between the EV and
SDR—this inherently represents only a small part of our system,
namely Part I of Debt Accumulation (cf. gs. 1 and 2)—much of our
protocol can be integrated into this standard in an intuitive way.
Details of how this might be done can be found in appendix B.
A privacy increasing modication of PnC was proposed under
the name POPCORN [31]. POPCORN employs anonymous group
signatures and three dierent trusted third parties to achieve anony-
mous one-way payments as long as no parties collude. It does not
hide individual transactions from the eMO, is not portable, its proof-
of-concept implementation is inecient and no security or privacy
proof is given. Some of POPCORN’s privacy properties were later
veried in ProVerif [9] by Fazouane et al. [24], who simultaneously
identied several weaknesses.
Lastly, we consider the option of anonymous e-cash for V2G
payments. One general drawback of e-cash is that it is a prepaid
and primarily one-way system. Hence parties need to always have
coins of exactly the right amount at hand for any transaction they
might want to participate in—which limits either pricing exibility
or eciency. When trying to employ e-cash for two-way payments
in a V2G scenario there are several technical roadblocks. In stan-
dard oine e-cash (e.g., [14]), coins are not transferable without
consulting the bank. When the user receives e-coins from the
EVSE—which could be done by leing the EVSE participate in the
spending protocol as the payer and the user as the payee—they
rst need to deposit those coins with the operator who originally
issued them. In case this operator and the EVSEs collude they learn
all the locations a user got rewards at. We also can not assume
that a user receives freshly issued coins directly from the operator
as rewards, as the corresponding e-cash withdrawal protocol is
not anonymous; only spending a coin protects the privacy of the
payer. Hence, the privacy guarantees that standard oine e-cash
provides do not t our needs. Transferable e-cash such as [7] does
not achieve our goals either. Transferable e-cash schemes allow
to anonymously transfer an e-coin multiple times between parties
without consulting the bank. us, in our scenario an EVSE could
transfer a coin received from the operator or another user to a user
who is eligible for a reward. Unfortunately, there is an impossibility
result regarding privacy that applies to this scenario. Canard and
Gouget’s work [15] implies, that if the parties representing the V2G
payment infrastructure collude, payment and reward transactions
of a user can be linked.
BBA+ and P4TC. At its core, our proposed scheme P6V2G facil-
itates a black-box accumulator (BBA+) [29]. is building block
implements a personal wallet for anonymous, unlinkable point col-
lection and redemption. It ensures that a wallet can only be used by
its legitimate owner, protects against manipulation of the wallet’s
true value, provides double-spending detection and comes with a
mix of game-based and simulation-based proofs for user security
and privacy as well as system security. Homann et al. [32] utilize
BBA+ to build a system called P4TC which applies BBA+ to a toll
collection scenario and oers anonymous, unlinkable tolling with
post-payments. In order to fulll all desired properties of a toll
collection scenario, the authors augmented BBA+ with additional
features like blacklisting, selective tracing of misbehaving users and
recalculation of debt in case of a dispute. Moreover, P4TC comes
with a full simulation-based security and privacy proof.
1.2 Our Contribution
is work transfers, adjusts and expands P4TC to t the V2G sce-
nario. e resulting system P6V2G allows for unlinkable and e-
cient V2G payments, rewards and reputation scores. It facilitates
post-payment two-way transactions in a semi online and portable
seing and includes double-spending detection as well as features
for blacklisting (of both EVs and users), recalculation of debt and
contingency traceability. To the best of our knowledge it is the rst
system oering all these properties simultaneously and for some
properties it is the rst to provide them at all. Furthermore, P6V2G
is privacy-preserving and secure against malicious adversaries. is
was asserted in a comprehensive formal model and proof within an
established cryptographic framework, the Universal-Composability
(UC) seing [16, 17].
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To achieve the above qualities we build upon the toll collec-
tion scheme P4TC [32]. Transferring this to the V2G scenario
already provides several of the required functions and properties,
e.g., privacy-preserving accumulation of debt, a veriable fraud
detection feature and blacklisting for wallets. Some requirements
2
Although formal security proofs are not widely appreciated in application-oriented
communities yet, we consider it vital for security (especially of complex and necessarily
convoluted systems) that this changes in future.
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of our system, like two-way payments, are not present in the toll
collection scenario where users only have to pay toll and clear their
wallet once, but do not collect rewards. Fortunately this important
feature is still achieved by the employed black-box accumulator
without any further modications. ere are, however, several char-
acteristics of our seing with either much simpler or no equivalent
aspects at all in P4TC, which call for novel solutions. First and
most challenging among them is the presence of multiple operators
instead of just one operating party in P4TC. is introduces con-
siderable complexity as it yields additional potential for security
threats in the system which our protocols have to preclude. Similar
challenges arise from the user side of the system. Other than in
P4TC—where a user is represented by their car’s xed on-board
unit—our system is designed to be portable. Hence, the user’s side
is divided into two separate parties: user accounts, containing the
users’ wallets, and EVs represented by their communication con-
troller. While user accounts have a similar role to on-board units
in P4TC, EV communication controllers introduce additional com-
plexity. Among other challenges, they require an additional but
likewise privacy-preserving blacklisting mechanism to deal with
stolen cars. Furthermore, P4TC does not include any reputation
scheme for the reliability of users. While our formal model and
proof largely follow the structure of [32], they are more complex
due to the existence of arbitrarily many operators (instead of just
one in P4TC) and EV communication controllers as entirely new
parties.
2 SYSTEM DEFINITION
is section introduces the general type of V2G system we consider.
In addition to the overall seing this includes details on participat-
ing parties, required functions and desired features. An overview





































Figure 1: Overview of Parties andeir Interactions
We consider a seing in which multiple charging point operators
each provide publicly accessible EVSEs for EVs. Users can charge
their EVs at EVSEs as well as oer their EV’s baery capacity to pro-
vide ancillary services to the grid. For these bidirectional services
each user gets an accumulated bill from their own eMO at the end
of each billing period. We assume that charging point operators and
eMOs cooperate in a way that every user may use any of the EVSEs.
While the necessary information to manage operator accounting is
included in our system, the nancial selement between operators
lies outside the scope of our system.
2.1 Parties
We now give a detailed description of the dierent parties and their
roles. An operator (OPR) O is either the eMO of an EV, a charging
point operator maintaining EVSEs, or possibly both. Each EVSE
is represented by their supply equipment communication controller
(SECC) C and is assigned to one specic (charging point) OPR but
may be used by any (e-mobility) OPR’s customers. It is assumed to
have the capabilities for occasional database synchronization with
its OPR but does not require any permanent internet connection to
other parties. Dierent OPRs are assumed to occasionally synchro-
nize their databases as well in order to catch double-spenders. An
EV is represented by its electric vehicle communication controller
(EVCC) E. It needs to be registered to be able to participate in the
protocols but is not associated with any other party, enabling multi-
ple users to share the same car or one person using several dierent
cars. A user account (UA) A is a low performance electronic device
(we tend to think of it as a smart card) that is issued to a user upon
registration with their OPR. It contains the user’s wallet which is
used to collect debt and reputation during charging sessions and
is not bound to a specic EV. In addition to these mandatory par-
ties we assume existence of some regulatory dispute resolver (DR)
D. is party mainly handles disputes and gives permission for
any exceptional measures that either limit a party’s access to the
system (like being blacklisted) or detract from their privacy (e.g.,
recalculating the debt on an uncooperative UA). A user is a physical
person using an EV, deciding where and when to charge it, owning
a UA, picking their eMO and paying the bills. ey do not, however,
participate as a separate party in our protocols. e only input
needed from a user are the charge targets at the start of a charging
session. As we assume this choice to be indicated via the EVSE’s
human machine interface, it is formally made by the SECC in our
protocols. Other than this input the user is represented by a UA
and an EVCC for the duration of a charging session.
2.2 Functions and Features
e remainder of this section gives an overview of the functions
and features we require of a V2G system. In contrast to more
cumbersome prepaid and cash options, our aim is a post-payment
system where the user is able to charge their vehicle over the
course of a billing period and gets a combined bill for all their
charging sessions aerwards. Basic functions of a post-payment
V2G system include the accumulation of debt on a personal wallet
and clearance of this wallet’s debt. Both should be conducted in a
privacy preserving way, keeping transactions anonymous as well
as unlinkable. As an additional feature, we want users to be able
to gain (or lose) reputation for, e.g., adhering to their predicted
behavior. is way EVSEs might oer special taris to reliable
users while not trusting the predictions of users who regularly end
their charging sessions sooner than promised. All other features of
the system deal with fraud and misbehaving users: As explained
in section 4.1, not all kinds of fraud can be prevented in the given
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seing. But any fraud needs to at least be detected aer the fact. To
protect users from false accusations, this fraud detection mechanism
has to provide a publicly veriable proof of the user’s guilt. To
further protect the system from misbehaving users, we require the
possibility to blacklist UAs as well as EVs (independently of each
other) and a mechanism to recalculate the debt accumulated by
an uncooperative UA or lost wallet with the consent of the DR. In
extreme circumstances we also want the charging sessions of a UA
to become traceable.
3 PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
is section describes the main features and protocols of the P6V2G
system on a high level. To make these explanations more accessible,
we rst give an intuition behind the basic cryptographic building
blocks utilized therein. But readers with a cryptographic back-
ground may want to skip section 3.1. Aer going into detail on how
wallets work in section 3.2, section 3.3 gives an overview of the
dierent tasks P6V2G is composed of. Lastly, section 3.4 illustrates
the eciency of our system. For the complete protocol we refer the
reader to appendix E.
3.1 Cryptographic Background
In order to easily understand the following protocol descriptions,
familiarity with a few cryptographic primitives is essential.
Public Key Encryption. Encryption enables two parties to ex-
change messages such that no other party can read them. For
public key encryption, the party who wants to receive messages
rst has to generate a public key and a secret key. e public key is
then distributed to any prospective senders, while the secret key is
kept secret. When a sender wants to send a condential message,
they encrypt the message with the public key of the recipient and
send the resulting ciphertext instead. e recipient uses their secret
key to decrypt the ciphertext and recover the message.
Digital Signatures. A digital signature is a means to verify the
authenticity and integrity of a received message. Just like public
key encryption, digital signatures use a public key infrastructure
where two keys correspond to each party: a secret signing key and a
public verication key. e sender uses their signing key to sign the
message and sends the resulting signature along with the message
to the receiver, who veries the signature using the sender’s public
verication key.
Commitments. A commitment scheme enables one party to com-
mit themselves to a value towards another (receiving) party. e
receiver is sent a commitment, inside which the value itself is safely
hidden. At a time of their choosing, the sending party can reveal the
value to the receiver by opening the commitment. But the sender
can only open the commitment to reveal the value they initially
commied to and not alter the content in retrospect.
NIZK Proofs. NIZK stands for Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge.
As with any proof, a NIZK proof enables one party (called the
prover) to convince a verifying party that a specic statement is
true. e zero-knowledge property asserts that the receiver does not
learn why the statement is true, only that it is. In fact, the receiver
can infer nothing from the proof except the validity of the claim.
Non-interactive means only one message has to be send from the
prover to the verier—namely the proof itself. No further (back or
forth) interaction between the parties is necessary.
Pseudo-Random Functions. A pseudo-random function, intuitively,
is a function that is indistinguishable from one with truly random
output. At the same time it is eciently computable for anyone
with knowledge of the right input information.
Dynamic Cryptographic Accumulators. e central idea of cryp-
tographic accumulators is the representation of a set of elements in
a single accumulation value of xed size. On one hand this accu-
mulation value securely hides the elements within it. On the other
hand it must be possible to eciently prove that a given element
is indeed contained in the accumulator. Cryptographic accumula-
tors are called dynamic if elements can eciently be added to and
removed from the set over time.
3.2 Wallets
e concepts of wallets and wallet states are central for our P6V2G
system. At the beginning of each billing period, the UA and corre-
sponding OPR create a new wallet for the UA. is wallet is used
for one billing period and then cleared and exchanged for a new
one at the beginning of the next billing period.
A wallet is identied by its wallet ID λ and its current status
described by a wallet state τ . is wallet state is altered with each
transaction. It does not only store the current balance and repu-
tation of the wallet, but rather all information needed to conduct
a successful update aer the next charging session. To be more
formal, a (simplied
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 certC︸                    ︷︷                    ︸
updatable part




It consists of an updatable part
(
s
b, r xnext  certC ) that changes
with each transaction and a xed part
(
λ, aλ , pkOλ
)
that is created
once along with the wallet and stays the same for the whole life
cycle of this wallet. e components of the updatable part are the
last used serial number s , the current balance b and reputation r ,
the transaction counter xnext for the upcoming transaction and the
certicate certC of the last SECC that updated the wallet (con-
taining the SECC’s aributes and OPR ID). e components that
pertain to the xed part are the wallet ID λ, the wallet aributes
aλ and the public key pkOλ
of the OPR that issued this wallet.
At the beginning of a new billing period each UAA and its OPR
O create a new wallet by performing the task Issue Wallet (see








 certCO  λ, aλ , pkO ) .
e certicate certCO and public key pkO correspond to the issuing
OPR, who also assigns the initial reputation r (probably choosing
the reputation the UA had accumulated on their last wallet) and
wallet aributes aλ (for details about the choice of wallet aributes
see section 4.2). e wallet ID λ and serial number s are jointly
3
For a cleaner presentation we omit some variables from the wallet state at this point.
e le out variables are only relevant for cryptographic details like creating an
anonymous NIZK proof for the validity of the wallet state which we do not explain in
detail here. e complete wallet state can be found in appendix E.
5
computed randomness. Note, however, that λ is only known to the
UA and the OPR does not learn it.
Each time the user charges their EV, the wallet is updated via the
task Debt Accumulation (see section 3.3). Suppose at the beginning




b∗, r∗ x  certC∗  λ, aλ , pkOλ ) .
en a fresh random serial number s is jointly computed by the UA
and SECC and the transaction counter increased by one. Balance
and reputation are updated by respectively adding the total cost
(price minus rewards) p of the conducted charging and reputation




b∗ + p, r∗ + d x + 1  certC  λ, aλ , pkOλ ),
which the UA saves at the end of the charging process.
At the end of each billing period, the wallet is turned over to the
UA’s OPR for billing purposes. is is handled via the task Debt
Clearance (see section 3.3). e OPR learns the nal balance and
reputation of the wallet and can use this information to bill the user
accordingly. When this task is nished, the UA discards the wallet
and initiates the task Issue Wallet again to get a new one.
So far we only described the wallet’s state and life cycle, but not
how they are used to guarantee several of our system’s properties.
On one hand, whenever a UA communicates with an SECC to
update a wallet, they do not want to be identied or disclose the
content of their wallet. On the other hand, the SECC has to be
assured that the wallet they help updating is actually valid and
does not, e.g., contain a balance or aributes that were illicitly
manipulated by the user. is is achieved by utilizing commitments,
digital signatures and NIZK proofs. Although the actual process
is a lile more complicated, it generally works like this: Instead
of disclosing the old wallet state to the SECC, the UA proves the
(hidden) state’s validity by showing that the xed part was created
and signed by its OPR (and could therefore not have been altered
since the wallet was issued) and that the updatable part was updated
and signed by a properly certied SECC. Note that this previous
SECC is not identied in the process. Aer checking these proofs,
the SECC provides the UA with the necessary information to update
the wallet in exactly the right way and signs the (still hidden) new
wallet state so the UA can assure the next SECC of its validity. is
way, both privacy and system security can be achieved.
3.3 Tasks
is section illustrates the dierent tasks (like registering parties
or issuing wallets) our V2G system is composed of. While most of
our tasks have similar counterparts in P4TC, some are entirely new
(like Certify EVCC and Blacklist EVCC), and some tasks (like Debt
Accumulation) contain a core part that is similar to the correspond-
ing task in the toll collection seing but have been modied and
extended to encompass the additional requirements of our scenario.
Due to space restrictions, we describe the main task of Debt Accu-
mulation in detail but sketch the other tasks on a high level only.
Figure 1 depicts an overview of the tasks and the parties involved in
them. e only tasks missing in g. 1 are the registration task every
party conducts on their own before participating in the system
and the task Guilt Verication, which can be performed by anyone
(even from outside the system) as our double-spending proofs are
publicly veriable.
Registration. Before participating in the system, every party has
to register. is registration entails the generation of their respec-
tive cryptographic keys (used for encryption, digital signatures,
etc.).
Certication. Each SECC has to get a certicate from its OPR.
Main part of this certicate are a digital signature on the public key
and the aributes of the SECC. It is renewed each billing period and
used to ensure that the SECC is not corrupted. In addition to the
actual SECCs, each OPR certies themselves as an SECC as well.
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EVCCs have to also be certied, but by the DR. e core part
of their certicate is a revocation value rev. is value is drawn
randomly and stored by the DR. In case the EV containing the
EVCC gets, for example, stolen, the DR adds the corresponding
revocation value to a blacklist blEVCC that each SECC has access to.
Apart from the revocation value, the certicate contains a digital
signature from the DR on the EVCC’s revocation value, aributes
and public key.
Issue Wallet. e task Issue Wallet is executed by a UA and its
OPR at the start of each billing period. e UA obtains a new wallet
λ, allowing it to take part in the task Debt Accumulation, and the
OPR obtains a hidden trapdoor htdλ , allowing the DR to blacklist
the wallet and recover its debt if necessary.
Debt Accumulation. e Debt Accumulation task is special in
that it requires the interaction of three dierent parties (all other
require at most two). An SECC, UA and an EV represented by
its EVCC interact to realize the charging process of the EV. Note
that the task is only identifying for the SECC while the identities
of the UA and EVCC remain hidden from the SECC. Since Debt
Accumulation is the main task and in many ways representative of
our system, we describe it in some detail.
e task can be split into two parts: e rst part, prior to
charging the EV, consists of the SECC interacting with the EVCC
to determine its authenticity, baery characteristics and the user’s
charging choices. In the second part—reminiscent of P4TC’s Debt
Accumulation—the SECC and UA facilitate the billing aer charging
took place. Overviews of both parts can be found in gs. 2 and 3
respectively.
e rst part starts with the SECC sending a list blEVCC of black-
listed EVCC’s revocation values to the participating EVCC. e
EVCC computes a NIZK proof that shows its own revocation value
is not contained in this list. Additionally, it sends its baery’s char-
acteristics β , its aributes aE , and a NIZK proof that these aributes
are correct. e SECC veries both proofs and selects charge tar-
gets
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based on this information. For bookkeeping purposes and
dispute cases, information about the selected targets is sent to the
EVCC, which marks the end of the rst part.
e second part starts with the SECC authenticating itself to
the UA by sending its certicate certC . e UA checks this and
4
ey need an SECC certicate so wallets that are freshly issued by the OPR can not
be distinguished from wallets updated by an SECC.
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e possibilities for target seing are intended to be communicated via the human
machine interface of the SECC and selected by the (physical) user. Since we do not

















Figure 3: Overview of Task Debt Accumulation Part II
calculates the proper next fraud detection ID φ. Fraud detection
IDs are similar to a transaction’s serial number and essential for
the detection of double-spending in the task Double-Spending De-
tection. ey are computed by applying a pseudo-random function
PRF to the UA’s wallet ID λ and current transaction counter x , taken
from the latest recorded wallet state τ ∗, i.e., φ := PRF(λ,x). is
assures that fraud detection IDs are random and unique if and only
if no double-spending is commied. e UA sends φ over to the
SECC, together with its wallet aributes aλ and a NIZK proof that
the wallet state which all this information was taken from was
valid. e SECC veries that the UA is not blacklisted by check-
ing φ against the UA blacklist blUA and veries the NIZK proof.
Note that since the UA has to stay anonymous, it can not simply
send its wallet state over in the clear. Instead, it proves the wallet
state’s validity without revealing anything about the state itself. In
particular, the so far accumulated debt b∗ and reputation r∗ stay
secret, as this information could infringe upon the UA’s anonymity
and privacy. en both parties jointly choose a fresh random serial
number s using a Blum coin toss.6 A double-spending tag t (see
task Double-Spending Detection) is jointly computed as well. e
SECC then sends all information that the UA needs to correctly
update its wallet. is update information includes the price p and
6
A Blum coin toss is a two-party protocol that—using commitments—results in a
mutually known truly random value as long as at least one party is honest.
reputation gain d . e UA ensures that its new wallet state τ is valid





:= (φ, t), whereω
bl
is used again in the task Blacklist UA to
recompute the overall debt and reputation of a blacklisted and un-
cooperative UA and ω
ds
is used again in the task Double-Spending
Detection to convict a UA of double-spending. We assume that each
SECC periodically sends these database entries to the corresponding
OPRs.
Debt Clearance. e task Debt Clearance is executed between a
UA and its OPR at the end of each billing period. It is similar to the
interaction of an SECC and a UA in Debt Accumulation. e main
dierences are that the UA is not anonymous in Debt Clearance,
no new wallet state is created and the OPR learns the balance and
reputation accumulated on the UAs wallet. e goal of this task is
for both parties to calculate the debt the user owes its OPR, so that
they can be billed out-of-band.
Double-Spending Detection. e task Debt Accumulation and
Debt Clearance are always conducted with the assumption that the
UA presents its most recent wallet and wallet state. Due to the semi
online seing of the SECCs, this can not be enforced during the
tasks themselves, but any misbehavior has to be detected aerwards.
is kind of fraud that consists of the UA reusing and old wallet
state is called double-spending (see also the paragraph on security
in section 4.1). During the Debt Accumulation task, the SECC





in his database (which the SECCs regularly send their
collected data to) featuring the same fraud detection ID φ, double-
spending occurred. e OPR can now calculate the identity of the
UA by combining the two (otherwise non-identifying) database
entries that contain the same fraud detection ID φ, because they
will contain dierent double-spending tags t , t∗. e output of
this algorithm is the identity of the UA along with a proof of guilt
π that shows the UA is indeed guilty of double-spending. Aer
learning the identity of the fraudulent UA, appropriate measures
can be taken by the OPR out-of-band.
Guilt Verication. Whether a UA is guilty of double-spending
can be veried using the Guilt Verication task. is algorithm may
be run by any party. Essentially, the algorithm checks if a proof of
guilt π asserts the guilt of a given UA’s identity.
Blacklist UA. An OPR and the DR cooperate in the scope of
the task Blacklist UA to provide the OPR with the data necessary
to blacklist a certain UA. e OPR loads the set HTDλ of hidden
trapdoors from its storage and selects the entries htdλ for all wallets
of the UA that is to be blacklisted. e DR is the only party able
to decrypt the ciphertexts contained in hidden trapdoors and is
assumed to only cooperate in blacklisting tasks if the OPR has
valid reason (such as proven fraud) to suspend the users privacy.
e DR veries that the htdλ originate from the UA it wants to
be blacklisted to ensure the OPR handed over the correct hidden
trapdoors. Using htdλ , the DR can calculate the (as of yet secret)
wallet ID λ. Since the UA uses a pseudo-random function PRF to
calculate the fraud detection IDs φ from the wallet ID λ in each
run of Debt Accumulation, the DR can use its knowledge of λ to
precompute all fraud detection IDs the UA might use in the current
billing period. is yields fraud detection IDs {φ0, . . . ,φxbl } =
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{PRF(λ, 0), . . . , PRF(λ, x
bl
)} for each wallet which are collected in a
set ΦA . By adding ΦA to the blacklist blUA, this wallet is not able
to partake in a successful run of Debt Accumulation again. e
OPR can use the set ΦA to identify the corresponding entries of his
database Ω
bl
and recompute the current overall debt and reputation
of the blacklisted UA.
Blacklist EVCC. With the help from the DR an OPR is able to
revoke the access of a specic EVCC. To this end they run the
task Blacklist EVCC. Note that we require our system to be able
to blacklist EVCCs independently from any UAs they might con-
jointly be used with and that the Blacklist UA method—disclosing
otherwise unpredictable fraud detection IDs—is not applicable to
EVCCs. Hence the design of a separate and dierent mechanism
was required to complete our P6V2G system. Using cryptographic
accumulators we were able to achieve this in a way that makes
adding EVCCs to the existing blacklist very ecient: e OPR sends
the EVCCs public key pkE to the DR who assures itself that this
EVCC should legitimately be banned from the system. e DR then
uses pkE to look up the EVCC’s revocation value rev and returns
it to the OPR. is value can now be added to the blacklist blEVCC
on which the cryptographic accumulator is computed during Debt
Accumulation.
3.4 Eciency
To obtain a practical real world system it is paramount protocols
perform eciently under the hardware restrictions of the given
seing. In this section we show this to be the case for P6V2G.
Instead of discussing each task of the system in turn, we present
the runtime analysis for the task Debt Accumulation in detail. Not
only is this by far the computationally most extensive task of our
system, but it is (partly) conducted in the presence of a waiting user
and therefore time-sensitive.
e eciency of our protocols is heavily determined by the cost
of cryptographic operations, i.e., creating commitments, signing
messages, computing NIZK proofs and so on. Any other factors
only contribute to a negligible fraction of the overall runtime and
are therefore not considered in our analysis. e individual cryp-
tographic operations are constructed from atomic operations in
the underlying pairing group seing. More precisely, every crypto-
graphic operation is a combination of G1/G2 exponentiations and
pairing evaluations. is enables us to computationally determine a
reliable upper bound on the runtime of our protocols: We calculate
an upper bound on the number of respective atomic operations
performed by each party, measure runtimes of single operations on
the type of hardware parties would realistically employ, and com-
bine those values to aain an overall runtime estimation. Another
relevant aspect for the runtimes of our system are precomputations.
From the detailed protocol description in appendix E it is appar-
ent that many of the more complicated operations can easily be
precomputed before the start of the actual protocol. We therefore
distinguish between online and oine operations: Operations that
can be conducted before the start of the actual protocol are denoted
as oine operations. For Part I of Debt Accumulation, these may
be performed at any point before the EV is plugged into an SECC;
for Part II the parties compute them during the charging process
itself, before the user returns to retrieve their car. All operations
that depend on inputs of the protocol and can therefore only be
computed at the proper time are denoted as online operations. By
precomputing as much as possible the online runtime of the actual
protocol can be signicantly shortened and oine runtimes exibly
scheduled to convenient time slots. Table 2 shows the number of
atomic operations in the Debt Accumulation task, dierentiated by
parties and oine and online computations.
Party
oine online
G1 G2 Pairing G1 G2 Pairing
Part I
EVCC 91 82 0 42+2v 33 0
SECC v 0 0 0 0 140+y
Part II
UA 240 228 0 4 0 z+9
SECC 4 0 252+2j 3 9 10
Here, j := |aλ |, y := |aE |, z := |aC | and v := |blEVCC |.
Table 2: Upper Bound on G1/G2 Exponentiations and Pair-
ing Evaluations in Debt Accumulation
For the verication of NIZK proofs, we assume batch verica-
tion techniques from [30] to signicantly speed up the verication
process. Also note, that the number of operations needed for veri-
cation was generously estimated. erefore, the values in table 2
are upper bounds for the computational costs rather than exact
gures.
To get a more tangible measurement of runtimes, we need to
make assumptions about the hardware used in a realization of our
system. For an EVCC we consider a conventional on-board unit,
like the Savari MobiWAVE-1000 [42], to be a realistic choice. We
therefore measured the runtime of G1/G2 exponentiations and
pairing evaluations on the type of processor present in this on-
board unit: An i.MX6 Dual-Core processor running at 800MHz
with 1GB DDR3 RAM and 4GB eMMC Flash. e processor runs an
embedded Linux and is ARM Cortex-A9 based (32-bit). For the bi-
linear group seing, we use the Barreto-Naehrig curves Fp254BNb
and Fp254n2BNb [8, 34] (with 254-bit order) and the optimal Ate
pairing [40]. e resulting benchmarks for single exponentiations
inG1 andG2 and for pairing evaluations are 6.07 ms, 15.52 ms and
32.19 ms respectively.
For use in SECCs the Sitara AM335x processor—based on an
ARM Cortex-A8 (32-bit) running at up to 1GHz—has been sug-
gested [33]. Since this processor has a similar core to the ones of
the i.MX6, we use the same benchmarks to estimate runtimes for
the SECC.
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To realize UAs we propose to use either smart phones or
a smart card plugged into the EVCC to utilize its computing power.
Since the laer yields slower runtimes, we choose this option to
obtain an upper bound on the realistic runtime. We therefore use
the above benchmarks to calculate the runtimes for the EVCC and
SECC, as well as the UA. Combining the gures from table 2 with
the benchmarks we can now calculate upper bounds on the run-
time of both parts of the task Debt Accumulation. e results are
depicted in table 3.
7
Note that they were indeed measured on a single thread only.
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Party
Party Runtimes Total Runtime
oine online oine online
Part I
EVCC 1825 ms 1374 ms 2129 ms 5945 ms
SECC 304 ms 4571 ms
Part II
UA 4995 ms 346 ms 13389 ms 826 ms
SECC 8394 ms 480 ms
Here, j := |aλ | = 4, y := |aE | = 1, z := |aC | = 1 and v := |blEVCC | = 50.
Table 3: Upper Bound on Runtimes of Debt Accumulation
ese results show that the only time-critical part—the online
part of Part II—takes signicantly less than one second to complete.
All other parts do not compel the user to wait for completion and
with roughly 2, 6 and 13 seconds they lie well within acceptable
timeframes. Although these times are already sucient to not im-
pede a user’s experience with our system, we note that they are
still upper bounds in several ways: ey were obtained assuming a
very naive implementation without any computational optimiza-
tions, the number of group operations for proof verication was
generously overestimated and runtimes were calculated using a sin-
gle core only, when realistically multiple cores would be available.
Hence, we assume real runtimes to be even beer than the gures
given in this section.
4 SECURITY AND PRIVACY
is section discusses the security and privacy properties of our
P6V2G protocol. Aer reviewing the inherent limitations implied
by the underlying scenario, we individually detail the security and
privacy properties our protocol was proven to provide. Finally we
sketch how the formal proof was conducted.
4.1 Inherent Privacy and Security Limitations
To assess the level of security and privacy our protocol provides,
we rst discuss which security limitations and privacy losses are
inherent in the chosen seing and what levels of security and
privacy an optimal solution might be able to yield.
Privacy. Although ideally we would like OPRs to learn nothing
at all, there are things we can not hope to hide from them due to
their control over the EVSEs. Information they will always obtain
for a charging session are the ID and location of the EVSE, time
and duration of charging, charge targets put in by the (anonymous)
user, the EV’s baery properties, and the actual SDR
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of the session.
A privacy-optimal solution would not give away anything more
than those parameters.
Security. Some security limitations are imposed by post-payments
paired with the semi online seing of SECCs. Facilitating this in a
privacy preserving manner requires users to collect their debt on a
wallet instead of trusting the OPR with their information. In this
seing it is always possible for a user to reuse an old wallet state
for upcoming charging sessions. Without instant synchronization
the participating SECC has no way of knowing the old wallet state
8
Of course, this SDR should only contain details of the conducted charging, but no
identifying information.
has already been used before. is kind of misbehavior is called
double-spending and is a widely accepted drawback of semi online
payment systems like bitcoin or e-cash—regardless of application.
An optimal solution will detect this unavoidable fraud aer the fact,
identify the misbehaving user if required, and be able to recalculate
the debt missing from the user’s wallet. is feature is also required
in case a fraudulent user refuses to present their wallet for billing or
claims to have lost it, which can not be prevented either. Another
inherent limitation is that a maliciously colluding user and SECC
are always able to agree on updating the wallet in a way that is not
reective of any charging session that physically took place. Due to
this gap between the digital communication captured by our model
and the real, physical world, we had to omit the case of collusions
between the user side (UA, EVCC) and operator side (OPR, SECC)
from our security proof. We suggest mitigating the eects of cor-
rupted SECCs by adding timestamps to their aributes so that keys
of corrupted SECCs expire. Note also that the corrupt behavior of
a colluding user and SECC (or OPR) has no more consequences for
the security and privacy of honest users than if only the SECC/OPR
were corrupted, which is covered by our proof.
4.2 Proven Privacy Properties
Aer listing some scenario specic impossibilities, let us discuss
how P6V2G can yield nearly optimal privacy in this seing. Our
proof of user privacy asserts that in addition to the necessary infor-
mation listed in section 4.1, the only thing SECCs (and therefore
OPRs) learn from each charging session are the wallet’s, EV’s and
previous SECC’s aributes as well as the certifying OPRs. Content
of these aributes is a subject of choice in implementation and
fully determines the level of privacy provided by the system. While
empty aributes yield complete privacy, it would also be possible
to, e.g., include the users/EVs/EVSEs identities in their respective
aributes, and hence implement a fully identifying system. e
important point is that this level of privacy is explicit and easy
to check upon registration and charging.
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Realistically, wallet’s
aributes might contain the billing period (e.g., month) they are
valid for and information on whether the user has a business or
private contract with his operator. EV’s aributes might dierenti-
ate between standard cars and busses. An SECC’s aributes should
consist of the current billing period only, leaving all honest SECCs
with the same aributes. Simple properties like these yield that any
recorded transaction can only be aributed to a group of k dierent
and indistinguishable pairs of UAs/EVs—with k being the number
of UAs with the same wallet aributes and OPR multiplied by the
number of EVs of the same type—but not to any specic user in
this group.
Assuming this kind of aributes we formally prove the fol-
lowing privacy properties, even under participation of malicious
OPRs/SECCs or UAs/EVs in the system:
4.3 Proven Security Properties
We consider static corruption (and collusion) of an arbitrary number
of either UAs and EVCCs or of SECCs and OPRs (for an explanation
9
Once the system is implemented with a specic form of aributes, checking the
content of aributes is easily automated (and we would advise to do so), saving users
the eort of checking the system’s privacy level themselves.
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(P1) Charging sessions of honest UAs/EVs are anonymous and
unlinkable.
(P2) Tracing of an honest UA and recalculation of its accu-
mulated debt are impossible without cooperation of the
DR.
(P3) Tracing of a misbehaving UA has no more implications
for the privacy of all other UAs/EVs than if the traced UA
had never participated in the system at all.
on UAs/EVCCs colluding with SECCs/OPRs, see section 4.1). Any
corrupted party may maliciously deviate from the protocol instead
of just acting in an honest-but-curious manner.
Under this kind of corruption we prove the following security
properties:
(S1) A UA can only use wallets that were legitimately issued
to this UA.
(S2) If a UA commits double-spending (see section 4.1), it will
be identied.
(S3) A UA which does not commit double-spending can not lie
about or modify the debt or reputation on its wallet.
(S4) An OPR is able to blacklist a specic UA with cooperation
from the DR. An SECC will know that a UA is blacklisted
before its wallet is used for payment.
(S5) An OPR is able to recalculate a specic UA’s debt with
cooperation from the DR.
(S6) A UA that does not clear its wallet’s debt will be detected.
(S7) Only registered EVs can take part in Debt Accumulation.
(S8) An OPR is able to blacklist specic EVs with cooperation
from the DR. An SECC will know that an EV is blacklisted
at the start of a charging session.
(S9) No party can lie about or modify their aributes.
4.4 Proof Sketch
We conducted a simulation-based proof following the real/ideal
paradigm. For this type of proof the execution of the real world
protocol is compared to the execution of an ideal model where all
computation is done by an uncorruptible ideal functionality. e
idea is for the ideal functionality to be designed in a way that it
obviously guarantees the desired security and privacy properties.
A proof of indistinguishability of the real world and ideal model
yields that the protocol provides these properties as well. e
advantage over game-based approaches is that all security proper-
ties and restrictions are explicit. However, the traditional notion
of simulation-based security only captures security requirements
in a standalone seing, where a single protocol instance runs in
isolation. If multiple protocol instances run concurrently, this ap-
proach fails to guarantee security. e Universal Composability
(UC) framework [16] on the other hand does not only capture par-
allel execution of multiple protocol instances, but also the use of
protocols in an arbitrary context.
For our protocol πP6V2G, we prove in the UC {FCRS,GBB}-hybrid
model (cp. [18, 19]) that it securely realizes the ideal V2G function-
ality FV2G under common hardness assumptions for cryptographic
building blocks. Further information on the ideal functionality is
provided in appendix C while additional details of the proof can be
found in appendix D.
5 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
Based on the cryptographic toll collection framework P4TC [32] we
were able to develop the privacy-preserving V2G payment and repu-
tation scheme P6V2G. Our system facilitates two-way transactions
between EV users and EVSEs as well as reputation scores. In oer-
ing post-payment functionality—with, e.g., monthly billing—P6V2G
is a highly convenient system with low eort usability. We achieve
real world practicality by oering double-spending detection and
guilt verication features, contingency traceability (with the con-
sent of a designated authority) as well as blacklisting of EVs and
users. All the systems functions are subject to explicit and formally
proven privacy and security guarantees. Furthermore SECCs do
not require permanent online capabilities, as P6V2G is designed to
be operated in a semi online seing. Our runtime analysis demon-
strates the P6V2G protocols to be ecient enough for the low
performance hardware that is realistically present in the V2G set-
ting. With EVs and users modeled as two separate entities, the
system is fully portable between EVs and hence supports users
with multiple cars as well as car sharing between multiple users.
Although the P6V2G system is a complete and practical V2G pay-
ment scheme, there are several directions where further expansion
might prove benecial. Modelling the EV and the actual charging
process in more detail could yield additional features, e.g., an au-
tomated pricing check and continuous monitoring of the SECC’s
charging instructions. Another direction with potential for further
development would be the nancial selement between charging
point and e-mobility OPRs. At the moment each SECC needs to
learn the user’s eMO during a charging session to realistically pro-
vide OPRs with the means for nancial selement between them.
Appending P6V2G with a cryptographic protocol for nancial set-
tlement between OPRs could remove the need for this information
and thus further improve privacy.
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A NOTATION
Tables 4 and 5 provide an alphabetically ordered look-up table for
the notation used in our protocol and ideal model.
Notation Description
1G Neutral element of a group G
A A UA
ACC Cryptographic accumulator scheme
aP Aributes of a party P
base Base used to represent a wallet ID
b Balance, i.e., amount of debt on wallet
bbill Debt of a user at the end of a billing period
blEVCC List of revocation values, used to blacklist EVCCs
blUA List of fraud detection IDs, used to blacklist UAs
β Baery aributes of an EV
C Commitment scheme
C A SECC
CO e SECC played by the OPR O itself
c(P) Commitment (made by party P)
certC = (pk
sig





Certicate of a SECC issued by OC
certE = (rev, aE , c, d,σ )
Certicate of an EVCC
CRS Common reference string
D e DR
d Reputation gained during the charging session
d(P) Decommitment (made by party P)
E Encryption scheme
E An EVCC
e Encryption of secrets under the key of the DR
F Ideal functionality
FCRS Ideal CRS functionality
fΦ Mapping of wallet IDs and transaction counters to
fraud detection IDs
fΠ Mapping of double-spending proofs to UA IDs
frev Mapping of EVCC IDs to their revocation value rev
Φ Space of fraud detection IDs
φ Fraud detection ID
G Group
g Generator of group G
G
BB
Ideal bulletin board functionality
HTDλ Set of hidden trapdoors
htdλ Hidden trapdoor to blacklist wallet λ
idP ID of a party P




digit of the base-base representation of λ
λ′, λ′′ Shares of wallet IDs, created by parties to jointly
chose a wallet ID
m(P) Message content (from party P)
µ Choice of charging program
Table 4: Notation Used in this Paper
Notation Description
O An OPR




p Price of a charging session
pk
pur
P Public key of party P for purpose pur
PRF Pseudo-random function
π NIZK proof
r Reputation accumulated on a wallet
rbill Reputation on a wallet at the end of a billing period
rand Randomness used to encrypt secrets for the DR
rev Revocation value of an an EVCC
S Signature scheme
S Simulator
S Space of serial numbers
s Serial number of a transaction
s ′, s ′′ Shares of serial numbers, created by parties to jointly
chose a serial number
sk
pur
P Secret key of party P for purpose pur
stmnt Statement
σ(P) Signature (of party P)
t Double-spending tag
td Trapdoor
TRDB Database of transaction records trdb
trdb = (sprev, s,φ,x , λ, idA , idC ,b, r ,p,d)






(c, d,σ )C , certC 




Wallet state at the end of the transaction with serial
number s
ui Randomness to mask secrets in double-spending tags
v Accumulator value
w Witness needed to prove a revocation value is not
blacklisted
wit Witness for a statement stmnt
wl Whitelist of UA public keys
Ω
bl





Database entry for debt and reputation recalculation
Ω
ds




= (φ, t ,u2)
Database entry used to detect double-spending
x Transaction counter of a wallet
x
bl
Upper bound of transactions in one billing period
Z Environment
Table 5: Continuation of Notation Used in this Paper
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B INTEGRATION OF P6V2G INTO ISO 15118
In addition to the PnC payment method discussed in section 1.1,
the international standard ISO 15118 [21, 22] allows for alternative
payment methods to be added in future. In this section we will
discuss the integration of our P6V2G system into this standard,
following its communication structure of functional groups A-H.
e elementary use cases needed for P6V2G within those func-
tional groups follow the examples of use cases dened for a similar
purpose in the post-payment method PnC.
As ISO 15118 only deals with communication between EVCC and
SECC, the only part of our system it inherently applies to is Debt
Accumulation Part I—which would naturally be implemented as an
elementary use case of functional group D “Identication, Authen-
tication and Authorisation”. It is, however, possible to integrate the
complete tasks of Certify EVCC, Issue Wallet, Debt Accumulation
and Debt Clearance into the ISO 15118 in an intuitive way. Note
that apart from EVCCs and SECCs, these tasks are conducted with
participation of the DR, OPRs and UAs, so there is a party mismatch
to be considered.
Certify EVCC. is task is executed by the EVCC and DR to
obtain a certicate containing vehicle aributes and a revocation
value for blacklisting. It is conducted only once and has to take
place prior to the rst charging session that is to be payed for with
a P6V2G contract. We therefore propose this to be done at the
original equipment manufacturer (OEM), who should be in direct
contact with the DR to have all their vehicles certied. In this case
it would behave like the bootstrap or OEM provisioning certi-
cate, but without the need to be replaced by a contract certicate
later on. Alternatively—to remove the need for trusting the OEM
with anything more than provisioning certication—we propose to
conduct the protocol for this task within an elementary use case
C3 “EVCC Certicate Installation” in functional group C “Certi-
cate Handling”, resembling the current example of C2 “Certicate
Installation”. is elementary use case C3 would only apply to
the situation where the EVCC has not been certied before and is
connected to an SECC controlled by the DR.
Debt Accumulation. is task is the most complicated to inte-
grate into ISO 15118, because parts of it are conducted prior to
and other parts aer charging. Our system’s portability, with UAs
separated from EVCCs, further complicates the maer. While ISO
15118 provides the possibility for external identication methods
like our UA in functional group D “Identication, Authentication
and Authorisation”, it does not allow for keeping this identication
method physically xed to interact with again aer charging. By
plugging the UA (as a smart card) directly into the EVCC, however,
and having the EVCC relay (encrypted) messages between SECC
and UA, this shortcoming could be bypassed without loosing porta-
bility of our system. Hence the UA could be construed as part of
the EVCC for the duration of the charging session. For Part I of the
Debt Accumulation protocol (communication between EVCC and
SECC), we propose an elementary use case D5 “Authorization of
EVCC performed at the EVSE” in functional group D “Identication,
Authentication and Authorisation” following the example of D1
“Authorization using Contract Certicates performed at the EVSE”.
Part II of the Debt Accumulation protocol (communication between
UA and SECC) needs to be split up between two functional groups:
Authorization of the UA
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should be conducted within an elemen-
tary use case D6 “Authorization of UA performed at the EVSE”,
again resembling D1. e remainder of the protocol would then
form an elementary use case G3 “Wallet Update” within functional
group G “Value-added Services” resembling the elementary use
case G2 “Charging Details” which is used for creating the SDR for
PnC.
IssueWallet andDebt Clearance. In addition to an external method
(e.g., direct communication between the UA smart card and the
user’s eMO via an NFC reader at the users home computer), the
tasks Issue Wallet and Debt Clearance could be conducted in the
scope of a charging session.
11
Even though they are more com-
plicated and provide more functionality, wallets in P6V2G fulll a
similar role to contract certicates in PnC. We therefore propose to
realize the Issue Wallet and Debt Clearance protocols as use cases
C4 “Issue Wallet” and C5 “Debt Clearance” within functional group
C “Certicate Handling”—resembling the use case C1 “Certicate
Update” for PnC. C4 and C5 should be conducted automatically
within the rst charging session of a new billing period.
C IDEAL FUNCTIONALITY
For a simulation-based proof following the real/ideal paradigm we
need an ideal model to compare our protocol to. is type of ideal
model comes in the form an ideal functionality F , which can be
thought of as an imaginary trusted third party incorruptibly per-
forming all functions we desire in the given scenario. If a protocol
π is proven to be indistinguishable from the ideal functionality F ,
it necessarily yields the same properties and guarantees. Before
explaining the extensive and more complicated ideal V2G payment
and reputation functionality FV2G, we want to illustrate the work-
ings of an ideal functionality with a small example.
Example. Imagine a scenario where two mutually distrusting
parties P1 and P2 want to jointly compute the result of a function
f . Each party Pi is allowed to choose a part xi of the input that f
is supposed to be evaluated on. While both parties want to learn
the output f (x1,x2) and be sure that what they learn is actually the
correct result (security), neither wants the other to learn anything
more about their respective input than the result itself discloses
(privacy). e ideal functionality Ff in this context would know the
function f , get the inputs x1 and x2 from P1 and P2 respectively,
compute f (x1,x2), and send this result back to both parties.
Ff guarantees security since it is uncorruptible and f is xed
within its description. No party can inuence the computation of
the result f (x1,x2) in any other way than by choosing their own
input. Due to its outputs, Ff also yields obvious privacy. All any
party learns in an execution of Ff is the result f (x1,x2) as there
are no other outputs the ideal functionality makes (note that in
the ideal model no party can read, intercept or otherwise meddle
with message between the ideal functionality and another party).
In particular, no further information about the other parties input
is obtained.
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is includes everything up to the blacklisting check φ ∈ blUA in g. 32.
11
Please note, that this requires an online connection from the participating SECC to
the eMO.
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is example illustrates three main ways an ideal functionality
is able to yield security and privacy guarantees: Firstly, any infor-
mation that is needed, but that no party should be able to choose,
lie about or unduly inuence (e.g., the function f ) is stored within
the ideal functionality. Secondly, All computations are correctly
performed by the ideal functionality, not by any party. And thirdly,
the ideal functionality only outputs information to a party that this
specic party is supposed to learn and nothing else.
In the rest of this section we illustrate how the above principles
can be applied to get an ideal functionality FV2G for the scenario
described in section 2.
We divide the description of FV2G up into two parts. e rst
part consists of the state of the ideal functionality (containing all
information parties should not be able to lie about), the second
details its behavior in all the dierent tasks of a V2G payment
system. An overview can be found in g. 4 and we will explain
both in more detail below.
Functionality FV2G
I. State
e ideal functionality FV2G records:
• (Partial) Mapping a that maps a parties IDa idP to their respective
aributes aP .
• (Partial) Mapping O that maps a UA’s or SECC’s ID idP to their
respective OPR’s public key OP .
• (Partial) Mapping frev that maps an EVCCs ID idE to a revocation
value.
• Transaction database TRDB = {trdb} with entries
trdb = (sprev, s, φ, x, λ, idA, idC, b, r, p, d).
• (Partial) Mapping fΦ that maps a wallet ID λ and a counter x to
a fraud detection ID φ .
• (Partial) Mapping fΠ that maps a proof π to a UAs ID idA .
a
For UAs, potentially dierent aributes are assigned to each wallet rather
than the UA.















Figure 4: e Ideal Functionality FV2G
C.1 State
To assure the right information (e.g., a parties’ aributes or previ-
ous amount of debt) is used in computations, the ideal functionality
FV2G stores everything parties should not be able to freely choose
or lie about during the tasks of this system. It keeps track of all con-
ducted charging sessions by maintaining a comprehensive database
TRDB and several (partial) mappings for parties’ aributes, OPRs,
revocation values, fraud detection IDs and double-spending proofs
(cp. g. 4). is global state is used and amended when conducting
individual tasks with participating parties.
Information on all conducted charging sessions is kept in the
database TRDB. Its entries
trdb = (sprev, s,φ,x , λ, idA , idC ,b, r ,p,d)
are uniquely identied by a serial number s . Another serial number
sprev links back to the logically previous charging session that was
payed for with the same wallet. Each database entry contains
all information pertinent to one charging session. It notes the
identities idA and idC of participating parties as well as the wallet
ID λ. Balance b and reputation r give the state of the wallet λ
aer charging, price p and reputation gain d indicate by how much
these values changed during this charging session. e counter x
indicates the number of charging sessions conducted to arrive at the
current state of the wallet. Lastly trdb contains a fraud detection
ID φ which is a random number assigned to each pair (λ,x) of
wallet ID and counter and is used to detect double spending by
misbehaving users. is value is (slightly redundantly) stored in
the mapping fΦ as well: For every entry trdb with values λ, x and
φ the equation φ = fΦ(λ,x) holds.
In addition to this basic information, FV2G keeps track of some
information that is only relevant to feature tasks: e mapping fΠ
stores proofs π that indicate double spending by a UA idA = fΠ(π )
has been detected. e mapping frev stores a revocation value for
every registered EVCC that can be used to blacklist this car, e.g.,
because is was reported stolen.
C.2 Behavior
An overview of the tasks provided by our system was given in
section 3. e ideal functionality FV2G oers the same tasks with
the same interfaces (otherwise the protocols could not be indistin-
guishable from the ideal world): A number of setup tasks, three
basic tasks (Issue Wallet, Debt Accumulation and Debt Clearance),
and four additional feature tasks. In this section we explain the
ideal version of them by mostly summarizing what FV2G does, but
to beer illustrate the inner workings of the ideal functionality, the
central task of Debt Accumulation is shown in more detail.
Setup Tasks. Setup tasks include registration and certication of
parties. Upon registration, the ideal functionality checks a party has
not been registered before and supplies it with the necessary keys
to participate in the system. Registered EVCCs and SECCs have to
be certied as well. Certication of an EVCC by the DR entails a
check if this EVCC has already been certied or even blacklisted
before and otherwise assigns a revocation value to the EVCCs ID
to enable blacklisting in the future. Each SECC is certied by the
OPR maintaining it to provide it with the credentials necessary to
participate in charging sessions and update balance and reputation
of wallets in the name of this OPR.
Issue Wallet. In the task Issue Wallet FV2G creates a new wallet
for a UA and OPR. It checks the UA against the OPRs whitelist and
initializes a new wallet λ with an entry
trdb = (⊥, s,φ,x , λ, idA , idO , 0, r , 0, r ).
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e mappings a and fΦ are appended as well. Aributes and initial
reputation are provided by the OPR. e OPR only receives the
serial number s as output, the UA obtains its new wallets aributes
and reputation and the OPR’s ID as well.
Debt Accumulation. e ideal functionality’s behavior during the
Debt Accumulation task can be found in g. 5.
12
Again, FV2G checks
blacklisting and looks up the EVCC’s aributes before facilitating
the exchange of the EV’s baery aributes β and the charging
choice µ between the SECC and EVCC. In the second part, FV2G
looks up the transaction trdbprev corresponding to the wallet state
sprev that the UA indicates they want to continue from.13 It correctly
computes s , φ, x , b, and r for the new transaction entry
trdb = (sprev, s,φ,x , λ, idA , idC ,b, r ,p,d),
which is inserted into TRDB. Price p and reputation gain d are
provided by the SECC.
As output the SECC receives the transactions serial number s ,
fraud detection ID φ and the aributes and OPR IDs of the wallet
and the previous SECC. e UA on the other hand learns the serial
number s , its wallet’s current balance b and reputation r as well as
the price p and reputation gain d of this charging session.
Debt Clearance. e Debt Clearance task in the ideal model works
very much like the second part of Debt Accumulation. Dierences
are that the price of the new transaction entry is set to p = −bbill
and there is no reputation gain. e OPR additionally learns the
UA’s ID and the nal balance bbill and reputation rbill of the cleared
wallet. e UA in turn only learns this balance and reputation, but
does not get any further information. is ensures the UA can not
use it’s wallet again (without commiing double-spending) aer it
has been cleared.
Feature Tasks. e most important feature task is Double-Spending
Detection. On request of an OPR the ideal functionality checks its
database TRDB for double-spending, i.e., for two separate entries
with the fraud detection ID φ. If such entries exist, the correspond-
ing UAs ID and a proof of its guilt are appended to fΠ as well as
output to the OPR. If any party wants to check the validity of such
a proof, they can do so by means of the task Guilt Verication.
On input (idA ,π ) the ideal functionality checks if it previously
recorded fΠ(π ) = idA and returns the result.
e other two feature tasks pertain to blacklisting and are joint
tasks of an OPR and the DR. In both cases the DR only has to give
its permission while the OPR has to supply the ID of the party that
is supposed to be blacklisted. For EVCCs the ideal functionality
returns its recorded revocation value, for UAs all used and upcoming
fraud detection IDs are returned as well as the current balance and
reputation of the UAs wallet. is information can then be added
to the respective blacklists as well as being used for billing the UA
in question.
12
Please note that for ease of presentation, some special behavior in case of various
corruption cases has been omied from this gure.
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Cp. double-spending in section 4.1. Without the oine seing, it would be sucient
to look up the last transaction of the UA’s wallet.
Functionality FV2G
II. Behavior – Task Debt Accumulation
2. Upon receiving (blUA, blEVCC) from C:
– Leak blEVCC to the adversary.
5. Upon receiving (β ) from E:
– If frev(idE ) ∈ blEVCC,
Output blacklisted to both parties and abort.
– Look up the EVCCs aributes aE .
10. Upon receiving (OK) from E:
– Look up the SECC’s aributes aC and OPR idOC .
13. Upon receiving (sprev) from A:
– Select entry
(·, sprev, ·, xprev, λ, idA, idCprev, bprev, r prev, ·, ·)
from the database TRDB.
– Pick previously unused serial number s
R← S .
– Increase counter x := xprev + 1.
– If fΦ(λ, x ) is already dened
Set φ := fΦ(λ, x ).
Else
Pick previously unused fraud detection ID φ
R← Φ.
Append fΦ(λ, x ) := φ to fΦ.
– If φ ∈ blUA,
Output blacklisted to both parties and abort.
– Look up the wallet’s aributes aλ and OPR idOλ .
– Look up the previous SECC’s aributes aCprev and OPR
idOCprev .
16. Upon receiving (p, d ) from C:
– b := bprev + p .
– r := r prev + d .
– Append entry










11. aC , idOC
12. sprev
14. s , φ , aλ ,
idOλ , aCprev ,
idOCprev
15. p , d
17. s , b ,
r , p , d
Figure 5: Task Debt Accumulation of FV2G
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D PROOF
Following the example of [32], we conducted our proof in three
dierent stages. Firstly, the database maintained by the ideal func-
tionality is construed as a transaction graph and several structural
properties of this graph are shown. Secondly, for each corruption
case a simulator is constructed with which we can, thirdly, prove
indistinguishability of executions of the real protocol and ideal
functionality.
D.1 Transaction Graphs
e database TRDB maintained by the ideal functionality FV2G
can be visualized as a directed graph. We call this graph the ideal
transaction graph of the system. Each node in the graph corresponds
to the state of the participating wallet aer a transaction. erefore
nodes are labeled with the tuple
(s,φ,x , λ, idA ,b, r ),
containing all information relevant to the wallet’s state. e serial
number s serves as a unique identier of the node, so we oen
think of the nodes being the set of all serial numbers with the
other information aached to it. e directed edges (sprev, s) of
the Ideal Transaction Graph describe the link between a wallet’s
state before and aer a single transaction. Hence edges correspond
to transactions themselves and, are labeled with the information
(idC ,p,d). An example for an ideal transaction graph can be seen











φ1, (x + 1), λ,
idA, b1, r1
φ2, (x + 2), λ,
idA, b2, r2
φ2, (x + 2), λ,
idA, b3, r3
Figure 6: Visualization of an Ideal Transaction Graph
e rst step towards our proof is to show dierent structural
lemmas about the ideal transaction graph. As an example we give
the rst of these lemmas and its proof in full detail.
Lemma D.1. e ideal transaction graph TRDB is a directed forest.
Proof. A directed graph is a forest if and only if it is cycle-
free and every node has in-degree at most one. We prove these
properties by induction. On initialization of the system the graph
is empty and the statement trivially satised. Now consider how
each task modies the graph. Tasks that insert a new entry into
TRDB create a new node. e only tasks to do so are Issue Wallet,
Debt Accumulation and Debt Clearance. Assuming that TRDB is
a forest before inserting a new node, we can assert that TRDB is
still a forest aerwards by looking at these tasks in detail. Issue
Wallet adds an entry trdb = (⊥, s, . . .) to TRDB and hence adds a
node s but no new edge. Note that s is indeed a new node as it is
chosen from the set of idle serial numbers. erefore s is the root
of a new tree and TRDB is still a forest. Debt Accumulation and
Debt Clearance insert a new entry trdb = (sprev, s, . . .) each. Again
s is chosen from the set of idle serial numbers and hence a new
node in our graph. e only edge inserted is (sprev, s) which gives s
in-degree one, does not change the in-degree of any other node and
can not close a cycle as s has no outgoing edges yet. Hence TRDB
remains a forest. Every other task only queries the ideal transaction
graph, but does not change it. 
ere are several other statements we prove about the ideal
transaction graph. At this point we will only list them and omit the
proofs.
Lemma D.2.
(1) On each tree of TRDB, the UA idA is constant.
(2) ere is a one-to-one and onto correspondence between trees in
TRDB and wallets.
(3) Let (s∗, . . . ,b∗, r∗) and (s, . . . ,b, r ) be two nodes in TRDB with
an edge (idC ,p,d) from s∗ to s . en
b = b∗ + p and r = r∗ + d .
(4) Let s be a node in TRDB with counter x aached to it. en s has
depth x with respect to its tree in TRDB.
(5) Every node with the same depth in the same tree of TRDB has
the same fraud detection ID φ. Conversely, nodes with the same
fraud detection ID are in the same tree and have the same depth.
In a next step, we add in and out commitments, decommitments
and commitment contents
(c, d, m)inOλ , (c, d, m)
in
C
(c, d, m)outOλ , (c, d, m)
out
C
from the real protocols to each node in the ideal transaction graph.
ese commitments are from the xed and updateable part of the
wallet state before and aer the transaction that created this wallet
state (cp. section 3). is information gives a second set of edges
where two nodes s∗ and s are connected if and only if the out-
information of s∗ matches the in-information of s:(
(c, d, m)outOλ
)∗
= (c, d, m)inOλ(
(c, d, m)outC
)∗
= (c, d, m)inC .
We call the resulting graph the augmented transaction graph (cp.
g. 7).
Lemma D.3. e graph structures of the ideal and the augmented
transaction graph coincide with overwhelming probability.
D.2 Simulator
In this section we rst explain the function of a simulator in the













Figure 7: Entry of an Augmented Transaction Graph
Debt Accumulation with corrupted OPRside as an example of the
simulators in our proof.
e general idea of a simulator is that it functions as the ideal
world counterpart of a malicious real world adversary. We show
that for every real world adversary aacking the real protocol, there
exists a simulator in the ideal world achieving the same things in
an execution of the ideal model. But since the ideal model is triv-
ially secure and privacy preserving, the simulator can not gain any
advantage and so neither can a real world adversary. “Achieving
the same things” in this case means that an outside party can not
distinguish between a protocol execution in the real world with the
real adversary and the ideal model with the simulator, not even if
it may choose parties inputs and learns their outputs. is rather
complicated setup is simplied by combining the real world ad-
versary and the distinguishing outside party to form one entity,
the so-called environment Z .14 is environment controls all cor-
rupted parties completely—including malicious deviations from the
protocol—and chooses inputs for all honest parties as well as learn-
ing their outputs. Now either all parties run an instance of the real
world protocol πP6V2G (see g. 8), or all honest parties participate
in the ideal model and the simulator has to provide the interface
between the ideal functionality FV2G expecting inputs from the
corrupted parties and the corrupted parties who still run the real
protocol and expect protocol messages from the honest parties in
return (see g. 9). Now the protocol πP6V2G securely realizes the
ideal functionality FV2G, if we can construct a simulator S in such
a way that the environment Z can not distinguish between the
two cases, i.e., between the real world and the ideal model in gs. 8
and 9 respectively.
To do this we need to dene a separate simulator for every
corruption case and their behavior in each of our systems tasks. As
an example we take a closer look at the simulator for user security
and privacy performing the task Debt Accumulation (see g. 10).
In this case, the participating EVCC and UA are honest, while the
SECC may be corrupted. erefore the simulator S has to provide a
SECC’s input to the ideal functionality FV2G and protocol messages
the SECC expects from an EVCC and UA running the real protocol
πP6V2G. To achieve this, it utilizes the SECC’s output it gets from
the ideal functionality, the real protocol messages the SECC sends to
the EVCC and UA as well as its ability to, e.g., extract commitments
or simulate proofs with the trapdoor td it knows from choosing
the CRS.
14
Note that this simplication gives the adversary more power and therefore only
strengthens our security and privacy statement.
P · · · P
P · · · P
πP6V2G
Z
Figure 8: Real World
P · · · P




Figure 9: Ideal Model
D.3 Indistinguishability
As a last step we have to prove that the environment’s views in
the real world and ideal model (cp. gs. 8 and 9) are actually indis-
tinguishable. is is done by dening a series of hybrids between
those two worlds. e rst hybrid H0 is equal to executing the
real protocol while the last hybridHmax equals an execution of the
ideal model. Each hybrid is of the form
Hi = Exec(πi ,Si ,Z),
where πi and Si are incremental modications of πi−1 and Si−1
respectively. While π0 = πP6V2G is our real world protocol, the last
version πmax equals the ideal functionality FV2G. e simulator
progresses in the other direction with Smax = S being the original




If the SECC is honest, do nothing, else do:
• Load the recorded pksigD , pk
acc
D for idD .
• Upon receiving (blEVCC) from Z in the name of C:
– Call FV2G in the name of C with input (∅, blEVCC).
– Obtain SECC output (aE, β ) from FV2G.
– (crev, drev) := C6.Com(CRS, 0).
– stmnt1 := (aE, crev, pksigD ).
– π1 := P31.SimProof(CRS, td, stmnt1).
– Compute v := ACC.Evaluate(pkaccD , blEVCC).
– stmnt2 := (crev, v).
– π2 := P32.SimProof(CRS, td, stmnt2).
– Output (β, aE, crev, π1, π2) to Z as message from E to C.
• Upon receiving (µ) from Z in the name of C:
– Output (OK) to Z as message from E to C.
– Call FV2G in the name of C with input (µ, pkcertOC ).
– Obtain SECC output (s, φ, aλ, idOλ , aCprev, idOCprev ).
• Upon receiving (certC, c′′ser, u2) from Z in the name of C:




) := certC .
– If S4.Vfy(pkcertOC , σ
cert
OC
, (pksigC , aC)) = 0, let FV2G abort.
– s′′ ← C4.Extract(CRS, c′′
ser
).
– Set s′ := s · s′′−1.
– If a record (φ, (pkcertOC )











– Insert (φ, pkcertOC , t, u2) into Ωds.
– (c′C, d
′
C) := C2.Com(CRS, (0, 0, 0, 0, 0)).





– π := P4.SimProof(CRS, td, stmnt).




) to Z as
message from A to C.
• Upon receiving (s′′, d′′
ser
, cC, d′′C, σC, p, d ) from Z in the name
of C:
– Set dC := d′C · d
′′
C .





, 1G, g1), cC, dC) = 0, let FV2G
abort.
– If S1.Vfy(pksigC , σC, (cC, s)) = 0, let FV2G abort.
– Call FV2G in the name of C with input (p, d ).
Figure 10: User Security Simulator for Debt Accumulation
that does nothing but relay all messages. Instead of proving indis-
tinguishability between the real protocol and ideal model in one go,
it is now possible to do this stepwise by proving indistinguishability
between each pair of consecutive hybrids.
As an example lets look at one of the hybrid hops in our proof
of user security. e incremental dierence between the hybrids
H9 and H10 in this case is the following: H10 modies the task
DebtAccumulation. S10 replaces c′C in the message to the SECC
(cp. g. 32) by a commitment containing only zeros. Everything
else remains the same. e proof of indistinguishability between
the hybridsH9 andH10 is a reduction to the cryptographic prop-
erties of the commitment scheme used for c′C and its underlying
hardness assumption; assuming we had an environment Z that
could distinguish betweenH9 andH10, we construct an adversary
who would be able to eectively violate the hiding property of the
commitment scheme.
E P6V2G PROTOCOL
is section contains our concrete instantiation and complete proto-
col πP6V2G. Firstly, we show how the abstractly used cryptographic
building blocks (e.g., encryption and commitments) may be instan-
tiated to implement our system. Secondly, our protocol πP6V2G is
given.
E.1 Instantiation
Our P6V2G protocol πP6V2G uses cryptographic primitives like
commitments and digital signatures in an abstract fashion. Our
security proofs state what properties they need to have, but another
requirement is only stated implicitly. e languages for which NIZK
proofs are generated contain statements about primitives. erefore
these statements need to be compatible with the NIZK proof system
that is used. In the following paragraphs we provide an example
for an instantiation of the protocol πP6V2G. e security of the
instantiations relies on the SXDH assumption [27], the q-strong DH
assumption [5] and the n-DDHI assumption [10].
NIZK Proof System. e proof systems P1, P2, P31, P32, P4 and
P5 can be instantiated with the SXDH-based variant of the Groth-
Sahai (GS) proof system [27]. It is dened for languages Lgp that
contain statements described by the conjunction of pairing-product
equations, multi-scalar equations over G1, multi-scalar equations
over G2 and quadratic equations over Zq . e GS proof system
is perfectly complete, perfectly sound and Fgp-extractable for the
language Fgp that maps group elements to group elements and
elements x ∈ Zq to gxi . Moreover, it is known to be composable
zero-knowledge under certain restrictions. ese are met by the
language considered in the protocol.
e language L(1) of P1 contains range proofs to show that
λ′i ∈ {0, . . . , base − 1}.
ey can be implemented using the signature-based technique of
Camenisch and Chabounni [12].
Commitment Schemes. Two dierent commitment schemes are
used throughout our protocol. e shrinking l-message-commitment
scheme from Abe et al. [3] with message space Zlq , commitment
spaceG2 and opening value spaceG1 is correct, statistically hiding,








under the SXDH-assumption. It has to be Fgp
′
-binding, because
statements about commitments from this scheme are proven and
the GS proof system is only Fgp-extractable. We use instantiations
of this scheme for C1, C2, C3 and C6 with l equal to two, ve, two
and one respectively.
18
e extractable commitment scheme introduced by Groth and




ing value space Z2q . It is correct, hiding, equivocal, extractable and
binding under the SXDH assumption. We use this to instantiate C4.
Cryptographic Accumulator. We instantiate the cryptographic
accumulator with a construction that has originally been proposed
by Nguyen [41] for symmetric pairings. It can accumulate up to
kACC elements, with kACC being a public, pre-determined system
parameter. Au et al. [6] extended this construction with proofs
of non-memberships and Lin and Hopper [37] adopted it to asym-
metric pairings. Security holds under the q-SDH assumption. e
accumulator is sound for any choice kACC ≤ q. e space of accu-
mulatable elements is Zq \ {−skacc} with skacc ∈ Zq denoting the
accumulator’s trapdoor. e value space of the accumulator equals
G1.
Digital Signatures. e signature schemes S1 to S4 can be in-
stantiated with the structure-preserving signature scheme of Abe
et al. [1]. It is EUF-CMA secure in the generic group model. e




is dened by the two parameters
ν , µ ∈ N0. en σ ∈ G1 ×G2
2





holds. We use instantiations of this scheme for S1, S2, S3, and S4
with (ν , µ) equal to (1, 1), (0,y + 1), (0, j + 1), (2l + 4, 0) and (3, z + 1),
respectively. Here, y := |aE |, j := |aλ | and z := |aC |.
Pseudo-Random Function. e PRF used to generate the fraud
detection IDs can be instantiated with the PRF introduced by Dodis
and Yampolsky [23]. It is an algebraic, group-based construction
and allows to prove that the function was evaluated correctly. is
function, dened by




with key λ ∈ Zq , is secure for inputs x ∈ {0, . . . ,n} ⊂ Zq under
the n-DDHI assumption.
Asymmetric Encryption. e protocol uses an adopted variant of
the structure-preserving, IND-CCA secure encryption scheme by
Camenish et al. [13]. e original encryption scheme is formalized
for a symmetric Type-1 pairing, but we need a scheme that is secure
in the asymmetric Type-3 case. For the conversion we followed a
transformation procedure as proposed by Abe et al. [2] with some
additional, manual optimizations. e transformed scheme can
encrypt vectors in G1 and is secure under the DLIN assumption.
e scheme is used as E in the task Issue Wallet to encrypt the hid-
den trapdoor of the wallet. Some explanations are in order on this
choice. Ideally, one would want to encrypt the wallet ID λ ∈ Zq in
order to enable blacklisting. Moreover, the wallet must prove to the
OPRthat it honestly encrypted the correct wallet ID. For practical
reasons the Groth-Sahai NIZK is used (see g. 39). erefore an
encryption scheme with message space Zq that is compatible with
the Groth-Sahai NIZK-scheme is required. As we are not aware
of such a scheme, the encryption scheme with message space G1
is used instead. But if the wallet would only encrypt gλ
1
, the DR
would not be able to recover λ from the decryption of e, because
the CDH-assumption holds in G1. To get around this obstacle, the
wallet picks its own share of the seed λ′ by randomly picking a






If base is chosen in a way that it is eciently possible to compute
the discrete logarithm for the elements λ′i < base, it is possible to
recover λ′ (see g. 36). e wallet encrypts all λ′i chunks, the OPR’s
share λ′′ and its own public key pkidA inside a single vector. As the
OPR’s share λ′′ is known to the OPRanyway, it can additionally be
stored in the clear alongside the encryption and thus does not need
to be split into chunks. Nonetheless, it is still required that the OPR’s
share λ′′ is part of the encryption such that none of the components
of the wallet ID is malleable. Otherwise an malicious OPRcould try
to evaluate the PRF at ineligible points and thus blacklist a dierent
(innocent) user. For the same reason, the wallet’s public key must
be bound to the encryption.
E.2 Full Protocol
Finally, we include our complete P6V2G protocol πP6V2G in this
section. An overview of each party’s locally saved state as well as all
tasks supported by the system can be found in g. 11. For readability
purposes most tasks are then given in two parts: a wrapper and
a core protocol. In the wrapper protocol the participating parties
mainly load and save internally stored information needed for the
current task. All interaction between parties is conducted in the
core protocol which is invoked by the wrapper. Lastly, if a protocol
includes a NIZK proof, the corresponding language (i.e., properties




e DR D internally records:
• Its public and private key (skD, pkD ).
• A mapping pkE 7→ (aE, rev).
An OPR O internally records:
• Its public and private key (skO, pkO ).
• A self-signed certicate certCO .
• A mapping pkC 7→ aC .





containing blacklisting information and double-
spending detection information.
A SECC C internally records:
• Its public and private key (skC, pkC).





containing blacklisting information and double-
spending detection information.
An EVCC E internally records:
• Its public and private key (skE, pkE ).
• Its certicate certE validated by the DR.
A UA A internally records:
• Its public and private key (pkidA, sk
id
A ).
• A set {τ } of all its recorded tokens.
II. Behavior – Tasks
• Register DR (g. 12)
• Register OPR (g. 12)
• Register SECC (g. 12)
• Register EVCC (g. 12)
• Register UA (g. 12)
• Certify SECC (g. 13)
• Certify EVCC (g. 14)
• Issue Wallet (g. 15)
• Debt Accumulation (g. 17)
• Debt Clearance (g. 16)
• Double-Spending Detection (g. 18)
• Guilt Verication (g. 19)
• Blacklist UA (g. 20)
• Blacklist EVCC (g. 21)
Figure 11: Protocol πP6V2G
UC-Protocol πP6V2G – Task Register Party
Party input: (register)
(1) If a key pair (pkP, skP ) has already been recorded, output ⊥
and abort.
(2) Obtain CRS from FCRS.
(3) Run (pkP, skP ) ← RegisterParty(CRS) (see gs. 22 to 26).
(4) Record (pkP, skP ) internally and call GBB with input
(register, pkP ).
Party output: (pkP )
Figure 12: Protocol for Task Register Party
UC-Protocol πP6V2G – Task Certify SECC
SECC input: (certify)
OPR input: (certify, aC)
(1) For the SECC side:
• Load the internally recorded pksigC .
• Retrieve pkcertO from GBB for ID idO .
(2) For the OPR side:
• Load the internally recorded (pkcertO , sk
cert
O ).
• Retrieve pksigC from GBB for ID idC .
• Check that no mapping pksigC 7→ a
∗
C has been registered
before, else ouput ⊥ and abort.





















(4) For the SECC side:
• Record certC internally.




O ) := certC .
• Retrieve idO from GBB for public key pkcertO .
(5) For the OPR side:
• Record pksigC 7→ aC internally.
SECC output: ((aC, idO ))
OPR output: (OK)
Figure 13: Protocol for Task Certify SECC
UC-Protocol πP6V2G – Task Certify EVCC
EVCC input: (certify)
DR input: (certify, aE )
(1) For the EVCC side:
• Load the internally recorded (pkidE , sk
id
E ).
• Retrieve pksigD from GBB for ID idD .
(2) For the DR side:
• Load the internally recorded (pksigD , sk
sig
D ).
• Check that no mapping pkidE 7→ (a
′
E, rev
′) has been registered
before, else ouput ⊥ and abort.



















(4) For the EVCC side:
• Record certE internally.
• Parse (rev, aE, c, d, σ ) := certE .
(5) For the DR side:
• Record pkidE 7→ (aE, rev) internally.
EVCC output: (aE )
DR output: (OK)
Figure 14: Protocol for Task Certify EVCC
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UC-Protocol πP6V2G – Task Issue Wallet
UA input: (issue)
OPR input: (issue, a, r, wl)
(1) For the UA side:
• Load the internally recorded (pkidA, sk
id
A ).
• Retrieve pkencD from GBB for ID idD .
• Retrieve pksigO from GBB for ID idO .
(2) For the OPR side:




• Load the internally recorded certCO .
• Retrieve pkencD from GBB for ID idD .
























(4) For the UA side:
• If VerifyWallet(pkidA, τ ) (see g. 35) returns NOK, output ⊥
and abort.
• Record τ internally.
• Parse (s, aλ, r ) from τ .
(5) For the OPR side:
• Insert htdλ into HTDλ .
UA output: (s, aλ, idO, r )
OPR output: (s)
Figure 15: Protocol for Task Issue Wallet
UC-Protocol πP6V2G – Task Debt Clearance
UA input: (clear, sprev)
OPR input: (clear)
(1) For the UA side:
• Load the internally recorded (pkidA, sk
id
A ).
• Load the internally recorded τ prev for sprev.
(2) For the OPR side:
• Load the internally recorded pksigO .





























• Parse (φ, −b
bill
, 0) := ω
bl
.
• Retrieve idA from GBB for pkidA .









OPR output: (φ, idA, aλ, bbill, rbill, aCprev, idOCprev )
Figure 16: Protocol for Task Debt Clearance
UC-Protocol πP6V2G – Task Debt Accumulation
SECC input: (charge, blUA, blEVCC, µ)
EVCC input: (charge, β )
UA input: (charge, sprev)
(1) For the SECC side:
• Retrieve pksigD , pk
acc
D for ID idD .
(2) For the EVCC side:
• Load the internally recorded (pkidE , sk
id
E ).
• Load the internally recorded certE .
• Retrieve pksigD , pk
acc
D from GBB for ID idD .























(4) For the SECC side:
• Conduct charging.
• Determine p and d .
• Load the internally recorded (pkC, skC).
• Load the internally recorded certC .
(5) For the UA side:
• Load the internally recorded (pkidA, sk
id
A ).
• Load the internally recorded τ prev for sprev.






















• Parse φ from ω
bl
.




(7) For the UA side:
• If VerifyWallet(pkidA, τ ) (see g. 35) returns NOK, output ⊥
and abort.
• Record τ internally.
• Parse (aC, s, b, r ) from τ .
SECC output: (aλ, idOλ , aE, β, s, φ)
EVCC output: (aλ, idOλ , µ)
UA output: (aC, s, b, r, p, d )
Figure 17: Protocol for Task Debt Accumulation
UC-Protocol πP6V2G – Task Double-Spending Detection
OPR input: (detect, φ)
(1) Load the recorded set Ω
ds










= (φ, t, u2) and ω∗
ds
=
(φ, t ∗, u∗
2
), such that u2 , u∗
2
.
(3) Set skidA := (t − t
∗) · (u2 − u∗
2
)−1 mod q.




(5) Retrieve idA from GBB for pkidA .
(6) Set π := skidA .
OPR output: (idA, π )
Figure 18: Protocol for Task Double-Spending Detection
21
UC-Protocol πP6V2G – Task Guilt Verication
Party input: (verify, idA, π )
(1) Retrieve pkidA from GBB for idA .
(2) If gπ
1
= pkidA then out := OK, else out := NOK.
Party output: (out)
Figure 19: Protocol for Task Guilt Verication
UC-Protocol πP6V2G – Task Blacklist UA
DR input: (blacklistUA, idAD )
OPR input: (blacklistUA, idAO )
(1) For the DR side:
• Load the internally recorded skencD .
• Retrieve pkidAD from GBB for idAD .
(2) For the OPR side:
• Load internally recorded set HTDλ and set HTDAλ =
{htdλ |(idA, htdλ ) ∈ HTDλ }.
















(4) For the OPR side:





be the subset of blacklist database entries (φ, p, d ) ∈
Ω
bl
with fraud detection ID φ ∈ ΦA .




OPR output: (bbill, r bill, ΦA )
Figure 20: Protocol for Task Blacklist UA
UC-Protocol πP6V2G – Task Blacklist EVCC
DR input: (blacklistEVCC)
OPR input: (blacklistEVCC, idE )
(1) For the DR side:
• Load the mapping {pkidE∗ } → ({aE∗ } × {rev }) and call it
frev.
(2) For the OPR side:
• Retrieve pkidE from GBB for idE .

















D ) ← S2.Gen(CRS)
(pkencD , sk
enc
D ) ← E.Gen(CRS)
(pkaccD , sk
acc
D ) ← ACC.Gen(CRS)













return (pkD, skD )




O ) ← S3.Gen(CRS)
(pkcertO , sk
cert


















return (pkO, skO )




C ) ← S1.Gen(CRS)
return (pksigC , sk
sig
C )










return (pkidE , sk
id
E )




































∗, aC, (pkcertO )
∗, σ certO ) := certC




C , aC)) = 0
return (⊥)
return (certC) return (OK)







D , aE )
aE
(c′, d′) := C3.Com(CRS, (0, skidE ))
stmnt := (c′, pkidE )




π := P2.Prove(CRS, stmnt, wit)
π , c′, pkidE
stmnt := (c′, pkidE )




(c′′, d′′) := C3.Com(CRS, (rev, 0))
c := c′ · c′′
σ := S2.Sign(sksigD , (c, aE ))
d′′, c, σ , rev
d := d′ · d′′
if C3.Open(CRS, (Rev, pkidE ), c, d) = 0
∨ S2.Vfy(pksigD , σ , (c, aE )) = 0
return (⊥)
certE := (rev, aE, c, d, σ )
return (certE ) return (rev)















, certCO , a, r, wl)
s′
R← S s′′ R← S
for i ∈ {0, . . . , ` }
λ′i






























if pkidA < wl
return (notwhitelisted)
a, r, s′′, λ′′, certCO




O ) := certCO





, aO )) = 0
return (⊥)
s := s′ · s′′








e := E.Enc(pkencD , (Λ
′
0
, . . . , Λ′`, Λ
′′, pkidA ); rand1, rand2)
(cO, dO ) := C1.Com(CRS, (λ, skidA ))




stmnt := (pkidA, pk
enc
D , e, cO, cCO , c
′
pre-seed
, Λ′′, r )

























π := P1.Prove(CRS, stmnt, wit)










s := s′ · s′′
stmnt := (pkidA, pk
enc
D , e, cO, cCO , c
′
pre-seed
, Λ′′, r )



















, certCO , a, r, wl)
.
.
. σO := S3.Sign(sk
sig




, (cCO , s))
σCO , σO









 (c, d, σ )CO , certCO  λ, a, (c, d, σ )O, pksigO ) htdλ := (pkidA, s, λ′′, e)
return (τ ) return (s, htdλ )











D , blEVCC, µ)
blEVCC
parse (rev, aE, c, d, σ ) := certE
if rev ∈ blEVCC
return (blacklisted)
v := ACC.Evaluate(pkaccD , blEVCC)
w := ACC.InitWit(pkaccD , rev, blEVCC)
(crev, drev) := C6.Com(CRS, rev)
stmnt1 := (aE, crev, pksigD )
wit1 := (pkidE , g
rev
1
, d, drev, g
skidE
2
, c, σ )
π1 = P31.Prove(CRS, stmnt1, wit1)
stmnt2 := (crev, v)
wit2 = (rev, grev1 , drev, w )
π2 = P32.Prove(CRS, stmnt2, wit2)
β, aE, crev, π1, π2
stmnt1 := (aE, crev, pksigD )
if P31.Vfy(CRS, stmnt1, π1) = 0
return (⊥)
v := ACC.Evaluate(pkaccD , blEVCC)
stmnt2 := (crev, v)




return (µ) return (aE, β )





















parse (pksigC , aC, pk
cert
OC
, σ certOC ) := certC
if S4.Vfy(pkcertOC , σ
cert
OC





bprev, r prevx, u1(c, d, σ )Cprev, certCprev 











C) := C2.Com(CRS, (λ, b
prev, r prev, unext
1
, x ))
φprev := PRF(λ, x − 1)
φ := PRF(λ, x )










wit := (λ, u1, x, skidA, s

























(c, d, σ )Oλ )
π := P4.Prove(CRS, stmnt, wit)










if P4.Vfy(CRS, stmnt, π ) = 0
return (⊥)
if φ ∈ blUA
return (blacklisted)
s := s′ · s′′
(c′′C, d
′′











C, σC, p, d














prev) C(sksigC , certC, blUA, p, d )









b := bprev + p




b, r (x + 1), unext
1
(c, d, σ )C, certC  ωbl := (φ, p, d )






:= (φ, t, u2)



















bprev, r prevx, u1(c, d, σ )Cprev, certCprev 





t := skidA · u2 + u1 mod q
φprev := PRF(λ, x − 1)
φ := PRF(λ, x )

















wit := (λ, u1, x, skidA, φ
prev, Λ, U1, X , sprev,
(c, d, σ )Cprev, σ certOCprev , pk
sig
Cprev, (c, d, σ )Oλ )
π := P5.Prove(CRS, stmnt, wit)






















:= (φ, −bprev, 0)
ω
ds
:= (φ, t, u2)











b, r xnext, unext
1
(c, d, σ )C, certC λ, aλ, (c, d, σ )Oλ , pksigOλ ) := τ
parse (pksigC , aC, pk
cert
OC




















), cC, dC) = 1
∧ S3.Vfy(pksigOλ , σOλ , (cOλ , aλ )) = 1 ∧ S1.Vfy(pk
sig
C , σC, (cC, s)) = 1 ∧ S4.Vfy(pk
cert
OC
, σ certOC , (pk
sig





Figure 35: Core Protocol VerifyWallet
D(skencD , pk
id
AD ) O(HTDλ )
HTDλ
ΦA := ∅
for htdλ ∈ HTDλ
parse (pkidAO , s, λ
′′, e) := htdλ
(Λ′
0
, . . . , Λ′`, Λ
′′, pkidAO
) ← E.Dec(skencD , e)
if encryption fails ∨ Λ′′ , gλ′′
1




λ := λ′′ +
∑̀
i=0
DLOG(Λ′i ) · basei
ΦA := ΦA ∪ {PRF(λ, 0), . . . , PRF(λ, xbl)}
ΦA
return (OK) return (ΦA )
Figure 36: Core Protocol BlacklistUA
D(frev) O(pkidE )
pkidE
(aE, rev) := frev(pkidE )
rev
return (OK) return (rev)








∃ d ∈ G1; SkidE ∈ G2 :
C3.Open(CRS, (1G1, pkidE ), c, d) = 1,




















∃ rand1, rand2, λ, λ′, λ′
0





, Λ, Λ′, Λ′
0
, . . . , Λ′
`




SkidA ∈ G2 :
C1.Open(CRS, (Λ, pkidA ), cO, dO ) = 1,






e(pkidA, g2) = e(g1, Sk
id
A ),
Λ = Λ′ · Λ′′, Λ = gλ
1










e = E.Enc(pkencD , (Λ
′
0
, . . . , Λ′
`
, Λ′′, pkidA ); rand1, rand2),∀i ∈ {0, . . . , ` } :

















∃ pkidE , Rev, d, drev ∈ G1; SkidE , c ∈ G2;σ ∈ G1 ×G22 :
C3.Open(CRS, (Rev, pkidE ), c, d) = 1,
C6.Open(CRS, Rev, crev, drev) = 1,
S2.Vfy(pksigD , σ , (c, aE )) = 1,










∃ rev ∈ Zq ; Rev, drev ∈ G1;w ∈ G1 ×Zq




Ω(w, rev, v) = 1


















∃ λ, u1, x, skidA ∈ Zq ;
sprev, φprev, pkidA, Λ, U1, U
next
1
, X , Bprev, Rprev, d′C, dO, dCprev ∈ G1;
cOλ , cCprev ∈ G2;












C2.Open(CRS, (Λ, Bprev, Rprev, U next
1
, X ), c′C, d
′
C) = 1,
C1.Open(CRS, (Λ, pkidA ), cOλ , dOλ ) = 1,
C2.Open(CRS, (Λ, Bprev, Rprev, U1, X ), cCprev, dCprev ) = 1,








, (pksigCprev, aCprev )) = 1,
φprev = PRF(λ, x − 1), φ = PRF(λ, x ),
t = skidA · u2 + u1 mod q,
Λ = gλ
1
, U1 = g
u1
1
, X = gx
1
























∃ λ, u1, x, skidA ∈ Zq ;
φprev, Λ, U1, X , dOλ , dCprev ∈ G1;
cOλ , cCprev, s
prev ∈ G2;












C1.Open(CRS, (Λ, pkidA ), cOλ , dOλ ) = 1,
C2.Open(CRS, (Λ, Bprev, Rprev, U1, X ), cCprev, dCprev ) = 1,
S3.Vfy(pksigOλ , σOλ , (cOλ , aλ )) = 1,





, (pksigCprev, aCprev )) = 1,
φprev = PRF(λ, x − 1), φ = PRF(λ, x ),
t = skidA · u2 + u1 mod q,
Λ = gλ
1
, U1 = g
u1
1
, X = gx
1





Figure 42: Language used in Core Protocol DebtClearance
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